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Abstract
A firm must decide whether to launch a new product. A launch im-
plies considerable fixed costs, so the firm would like to assess downstream
demand before it decides. We study under which conditions a potential
buyer would be willing to reveal his willingness to pay under diﬀerent
pricing regimes. We show that the firm’s welfare — as well as consumers’
— may be higher with a commitment to linear pricing than when pric-
ing is unrestricted. That is, if informational asymmetries are significant,
price regulations such as the Robinson-Patman Act may be endorsed by
all parties.
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1 Introduction
Whether suppliers’ possibility to discriminate between buyers should be regu-
lated by law has been subject to a long-lasting debate among economists. The
traditional view has been that if suppliers are allowed to price discriminate,
they will favor dominant firms (e.g. chain stores) at the expense of small mer-
chants that have little bargaining power. Such a development was considered
undesirable from both an eﬃciency and equity perspective, and precipitated the
adoption of the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936, section 2 of which forbids price
diﬀerentiation when it has the potential to substantially lessen competition.1 ,2
Bork (1978), among others, argues that the reasoning behind the Act was
flawed: whole categories of buyers may not be served at all unless discrimination
is allowed, which may reverse both the eﬃciency and equity rationale for regula-
tion. That is, if suppliers are forced to use linear pricing, they may (optimally)
set prices so high that low-elasticity buyers are completely left out of the mar-
ket. Consequently, in intermediate markets non-discrimination rules may have
a serious eﬀect on downstream competition.3 Today the prevailing view among
economists seems to be that, although the welfare eﬀect of price discrimination
in general is ambiguous (Schmalensee 1981, Varian 1985), non-discrimination
rules probably do more harm than good.4
In this paper we bring forth a new argument in support of price regulations in
an incomplete-information environment. We show that a uniform pricing rule,
which guarantees all (active) buyers a strict surplus, may enable information
sharing between buyer and seller. Such communication increases welfare in two
1For example, in the case of linear demand and constant returns to scale, it has been shown
that, if all markets (customers) are served under linear pricing, allowing price discrimination
strictly reduces welfare (Schmalensee 1981).
2 Similar non-discrimination regulations exist in other countries, see, e.g., Frazer (1988).
3Other arguments raised against the Robinson-Patman Act are that it facilitates collusion,
discourages entry, induces artificial product diﬀerentiation, and moreover, that enforcement
of the Act is very costly (see Martin 1988).
4However, Katz (1987) points out that buyers in intermediate good markets often can
integrate backwards, i.e., supply the input themselves. When this is the case, Katz shows
that price discrimination may lead to higher input prices for all buyers. However, see O’Brien
and Shaﬀer (1994) for a result to the opposite eﬀect.
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ways: it increases the probability of (eﬃcient) production in instances where
demand is high, and reduces the probability of (wasteful) production when
demand is low. Moreover, the welfare gain may not accrue only to buyers,
which means that a pricing restriction may also be preferred by the seller. That
is, a price regulation, properly enforced by the judicial system, constitutes a
commitment device that sellers may be unable to achieve on their own.
Most closely related to the current paper is Farrell and Gibbons (1995). The
authors consider a producer’s problem of eliciting investment-specific informa-
tion from a buyer. They show that reducing the producer’s ex post bargaining
power may enhance eﬃciency as the buyer’s incentive to reveal his private in-
formation is increased. The authors also show that the gain in communication
may outweigh the loss from the increased hold-up problem.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the
model. Section 3 and 4 derive the firm’s profit under a linear pricing restriction
and non-regulated pricing, respectively, and section 5 compares the two regimes.
Section 6 looks at buyer welfare, section 7 relates the current model to Crawford
and Sobel’s (1982) cheap-talk model, and section 8 concludes. Appendices A
and B contain some proofs and numerical results.
2 A Simple Model
A firm has the opportunity to produce a new good. There is no other firm
that can do this, so if the firm produces it becomes a monopolist. A production
decision implies a fixed start-up cost F , which is unknown at the outset. There is
also a constant marginal cost of production, c, which is normalized to zero. The
fixed cost may stem from setting up new machinery or infrastructure, training
new staﬀ, etc., and is sunk once incurred. There is a single buyer (or buyer
representative). The buyer’s utility function is vq − 12q2 − T, where v is the
buyer’s type, q is the quantity bought, and T is the total transfer paid to
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the firm.5 Note that with fixed unit price (linear pricing), demand is linearly
decreasing in price, q(p) = v − p, as long as demand is positive.
The game proceeds as follows. In the first, “constitutional” stage of the
game, the supplier chooses whether or not to commit to linear pricing. This
may be thought of as a lobbying process where the firm, possibly by spending
resources, may convince the legislator to prohibit price discrimination. The
buyer’s and seller’s types (v and F ) are then realized. The buyer’s type is
private information to the buyer, such that v ∈ {vL, vH} and vH > vL > 0. The
common prior is that v = vH with probability µ and v = vL with probability
1 − µ. In turn, the fixed cost is private information to the firm. The common
prior distribution is G (F ), where G is diﬀerentiable and has density g(F ) > 0
for all F ∈ [0, F¯ ], F¯ finite. In what follows we shall often consider the uniform
case g(F ) = 1/F¯ . We assume that F¯ ≥ v
2
H
2 , which implies that the cost density
is strictly positive over the entire profit range, which simplifies the exposition.
The buyer then sends a (possibly uninformative) message “Low” or “High”,
meaning v = vL and v = vH , respectively, to the firm. Messages are cheap
talk. Given the message and the observed cost, the firm then decides whether
to produce or not, and what price or price-quantity bundles to oﬀer. Finally
the buyer makes his consumption decision, and payoﬀs are realized.
To reiterate, the main purpose of the paper is to see whether it may be
optimal for the firm to restrict its price setting ex ante, i.e., at the constitutional
stage. For brevity we only compare two pricing regimes, linear pricing and
unrestricted (second-degree) price discrimination. This is suﬃcient to illustrate
the firm’s trade-oﬀ between improved ex ante communication and smaller ex
post surplus.
5The quadratic utility function is chosen for analytical simplicity, but we expect our quali-
tative results to hold for any utility function that exhibits strictly decreasing marginal utility.
As long as this holds, linear pricing leaves the consumer with a positive surplus and gives
the high type a certain incentive to reveal his type in order to increase the probability of
production.
3
3 Linear Pricing
Consider the situation where the seller commits to use linear prices. We first
have to make sure that both buyer types have an incentive to report truthfully; if
either type preferred to misreport the firm would gain no information relative to
its prior, and would never choose the linear pricing regime.6 From the quadratic
utility function we have that, conditional on a truthful message vi, the firm
optimally sets price vi/2, sells quantity vi/2, and makes gross profit v2i /4. This
means in turn that, in a truthful equilibrium, the firm produces if and only if
F ≤ v2i /4.
The surplus for a type i buyer, if the firm believes he is of type j, is
1
2
¡
max
¡
vi − vj2 , 0
¢¢2
. Therefore, type i will reveal his type truthfully as long
as
v2i
8
G
µ
v2i
4
¶
≥ 1
2
³
max
³
vi −
vj
2
, 0
´´2
G
Ã
v2j
4
!
, i 6= j. (1)
It should be noted that these incentive constraints are not automatically
satisfied. In particular, if 2vL > vH and the gain in production probability is
suﬃciently large, the low type might actually prefer to exaggerate his valuation.
However, when G(·) is uniformly distributed, (1) reduces to
v4i ≥ v2j (2vi − vj)
2 .
Taking square roots (both sides are positive) reduces the inequality to (vi − vj)2 ≥
0. Hence, in the uniform case the incentive constraints always hold. Since the
firm only produces if expected revenues are greater than the realized start-up
cost, its ex ante expected profit is, given a truthtelling equilibrium,
(1− µ)
Z v2L/4
0
µ
v2L
4
− F
¶
dG (F ) + µ
Z v2H/4
0
µ
v2H
4
− F
¶
dG (F )
= (1− µ)
Z v2L/4
0
G (F ) dF + µ
Z v2H/4
0
G (F ) dF, (2)
6For simplicity we restrict attention to pure-strategy equilibria.
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where the last step is derived through integration by parts.
4 Price Discrimination
When there are no pricing restrictions, the buyer has clearly no incentive to
reveal his type since the firm would extract all surplus. Hence, the firm neces-
sarily faces uncertainty about the buyer’s type. There are now two possibilities:
either it is optimal for the firm to oﬀer a menu such that both buyer types
purchase a positive quantity, or it optimally serves only the high type.
In the latter case it is clearly optimal to oﬀer the high type his first-best
quantity, vH , and charge a lump-sum tariﬀ
v2H
2 , thus extracting all surplus. The
firm’s ex ante expected revenue is in this case
µ
v2H
2
,
and, analogous to above, the ex ante expected profit isZ µv2H/2
0
G (F ) dF. (3)
If instead both types are served, two diﬀerent tariﬀ-quantity menus are of-
fered. Denote these (TH , qH) and (TL, qL). The incentive constraint for a buyer
type i reads
viqi −
q2i
2
− Ti ≥ viqj −
qj2
2
− Tj , i 6= j. (4)
It is a standard exercise (see Appendix A) to derive the optimal quantities and
the associated tariﬀs
T ∗L =
(µ(vH − vL) + vL(1− µ)) (vL − µvH)
2 (1− µ)2
and
T ∗H =
v2H(1 + µ)− 2vHvL(1 + µ) + 2v2L
2(1− µ) .
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This holds as long as µ ≤ vLvH ≡ µ
#. It is easily shown that if µ > µ#, only the
high type should be served. The firm’s ex ante expected revenue is
µT ∗H + (1− µ)T ∗L =
1
2
v2L +
µ (vH − vL)2
2 (1− µ) .
It follows that the firm’s ex ante expected profit is
Z 1
2v
2
L+
µ(vH−vL)
2
2(1−µ)
0
G (F ) dF. (5)
5 Committing to Linear Pricing or not
Let us now investigate whether it can be optimal for the firm to commit to
linear pricing. Consider first the case when µ > µ#, so that the firm, if price
discriminating, only serves the high type. Define the ex ante expected diﬀerence
in profits between price discrimination and linear pricing (using (2) and (3)) as
∆H (µ) ≡
Z µv2H/2
0
G (F ) dF −(1− µ)
Z v2L/4
0
G (F ) dF −µ
Z v2H/4
0
G (F ) dF. (6)
Linear pricing is thus preferred when ∆H (µ) < 0. Note first that ∆H (1) > 0; if
the firm knows that it faces high demand it strictly prefers to price discriminate.
Diﬀerentiating (6) twice with respect to µ gives
∆
00
H (µ) =
v4H
4
g
µ
µ
v2H
2
¶
> 0,
so that ∆H (µ) is a convex function. It follows that there exists a unique µ =
µmin where ∆H (µ) attains its minimum value. Intuitively, the more certain is
the firm that it faces either high or low demand, the less there is to gain from
communication. Whether µmin is larger than µ# and whether ∆H
¡
µmin
¢
< 0
depend on parameters. In general, the higher is the probability that serving the
low type is profitable,
R v2L/4
0
G (F ) dF, the more valuable becomes information
about the buyer’s type.
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The analogous argument holds for the case µ < µ#. Using (2) and (5), let
∆LH (µ) ≡
Z 1
2v
2
L+
µ(vH−vL)
2
2(1−µ)
0
G (F ) dF−(1− µ)
Z v2L/4
0
G (F ) dF−µ
Z v2H/4
0
G (F ) dF
denote the ex ante expected diﬀerence in profits between price discrimination
and linear pricing when µ < µ#. The firm strictly prefers to price discriminate
if it knows that demand is low, i.e., ∆LH (0) > 0. Linear pricing becomes more
profitable the larger is uncertainty over the buyer’s type (i.e., ∆LH (µ) is also
convex), and, as opposed to above, the lower is the probability that serving
the low type is profitable. The intuition is that, given that the firm serves
both types under price discrimination, there is a larger value in discovering the
buyer’s type if low demand is likely to be unprofitable.
Proposition 1. For any distribution function G, there exist values of µ,
vL, and vH such that (i) the firm’s ex ante expected profit is strictly larger
under linear pricing than under price discrimination, and (ii) the revelation
constraints (1) hold. In particular, this happens for µ’s close to µ# and for
vL’s close to zero.
Proof. First note that for vL suﬃciently close to zero, (1) holds for any
distribution G and any vH > 0. Let ∆# (vL, vH) ≡ ∆H
¡
µ#
¢
(≡ ∆LH
¡
µ#
¢
).
We thus have
∆# (vL, vH) =
Z vLvH/2
0
G (F ) dF−
µ
1− vL
vH
¶Z v2L/4
0
G (F ) dF− vL
vH
Z v2H/4
0
G (F ) dF.
Clearly, ∆# (0, vH) = 0. Therefore, to prove the claim, it suﬃces to show that
∂∆# (vL, vH) /∂vL < 0 for vL’s close to zero. Diﬀerentiating yields
∂∆# (vL, vH)
∂vL
=
vH
2
G
³vLvH
2
´
+
1
vH
Z v2L/4
0
G (F ) dF
−vL
2
µ
1− vL
vH
¶
G
µ
v2L
4
¶
− 1
vH
Z v2H/4
0
G (F ) dF.
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Evaluating this expression at vL = 0 yields
∂∆# (vL, vH)
∂vL
|vL=0= −
1
vH
Z v2H/4
0
G (F ) dF,
which is strictly negative. By continuity, it must be strictly negative also for
some vL > 0. ¤
Numerically it is easy to show that linear pricing also is preferred for other
parameter values than the ones considered in Proposition 1. Let µ0(vL, vH)
denote the set of µ’s such that ∆H (µ) = 0, and µ00(vL, vH) denote the set of µ’s
such that ∆LH (µ) = 0. Figure 1 illustrates the firm’s trade-oﬀ between linear
pricing and price discrimination with a uniform cost distribution.7
Figure 1. Price discrimination vs. linear pricing with information transmis-
sion (G(F ) = F, vH = 1). Linear pricing is preferred by the firm in the shaded
area.
7The data used to generate Figure 1 is provided in Appendix B.
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To summarize, transmission of demand information increases the firm’s profit
in two ways: it generates additional sales when demand is unexpectedly high
(and production was unprofitable ex ante), and saves the firm from production
costs when demand is unexpectedly low (and production was profitable ex ante).
The drawback is that linear pricing leads to lower quantities consumed (due
to decreasing marginal utility) and thus lower ex post profit. Hence, the firm
prefers linear pricing when uncertainty over the buyer’s type is high (µ is neither
very high nor very low) and when the profitability of production varies a lot
depending on the contingency (vH >> vL).
6 Buyer’s Welfare
Finally we should check whether linear pricing is also in the buyer’s interest.
The buyer’s ex ante expected surplus from linear pricing is
(1− µ) v
2
L
8
G
µ
v2L
4
¶
+ µ
v2H
8
G
µ
v2H
4
¶
> 0. (7)
This should be compared to his expected surplus under price discrimination.
First, if µ > µ# the firm would only serve the high type, which implies that
the buyer gets zero surplus regardless of type. Hence, in this case the buyer
obviously prefers linear pricing. If µ ≤ µ#, both types are served and the
buyer’s ex ante expected surplus is (the low type still gets zero surplus)
µ
µ
v2H
2
− T ∗H
¶
G
Ã
1
2
v2L +
µ (vH − vL)2
2 (1− µ)
!
. (8)
The diﬀerence (7) − (8) is ambiguous but seems to be positive in most cases
when µ ≤ µ#.8 Intuitively, the firm aﬀords the high type a positive surplus
under price discrimination only in order to keep him from switching to the low
type’s bundle. If this rent were too large (µ or vH large), the firm would prefer
to only serve the high type.
8For example, with G linear or exponential we have not been able to find a case where the
buyer prefers non-linear pricing.
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7 Relation to Crawford and Sobel (1982)
It may be instructive to contrast our results with the abstract cheap talk game
in Crawford and Sobel (1982, CS). In CS there is one perfectly informed agent
and one uninformed principal. The state space is the unit interval and the
agent’s and principal’s preferred decision (as a function of the state) diﬀer by
a known amount, b 6= 0. The agent sends a costless message to the principal,
whose subsequent decision aﬀects the welfare of both parties. The authors show
that the signalling equilibrium takes the form of a partitioning of the type space
into intervals, and that full information revelation never occurs.
The situation we study in the current paper does not, as a matter of fact,
apply to the CS setting. On the one hand, with a commitment to linear pricing
the conflict of interest is not as severe as in CS, in the sense that full infor-
mation revelation may be possible. With unrestricted pricing, on the other, no
information transmission is possible. Although we only study the binary type
case, this impossibility also holds for the continuous case (see Riley and Zeck-
hauser 1983 for a formal proof). To see the intuition, suppose that there were
a signalling equilibrium with more than one kind of message, which partitioned
the buyer type space into intervals. Clearly, the firm’s optimal pricing scheme
would leave the lowest buyer type in each interval with zero surplus, so this type
would strictly prefer to switch to a “lower” message. Hence, such a partitioning
could not be an equilibrium. However, the CS conditions apply to the current
setting (in particular, utility and profit functions are concave) which means that
the signalling equilibrium must take the form of a partitioning into intervals.
Hence, the only equilibrium is the non-informative one.
8 Conclusion
This paper puts forward a new argument in favor of pricing restrictions, namely
that such restrictions, by giving buyers a larger share of the surplus from trans-
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actions, may enable the communication of demand information from buyers to
sellers. We show that such a commitment may also be in the seller’s interest,
which means that regulation Pareto dominates non-regulation. An alternative
conclusion is that, in the absence of pricing restrictions, firms will not spend
resources on preventing agents from reselling, since such agents provide a com-
mitment against non-linear pricing.
Truthful revelation is possible only if buyers face a suﬃcient degree of un-
certainty over the prospects of production. Since high-demand buyers suﬀer
more from the absence of production, a separating signalling equilibrium may
exist. Although the current model is simplistic, nothing suggests that the basic
intuition would fail to apply to more complex environments, e.g., with several
competing sellers. However, the beneficial eﬀect of communication must then
be traded oﬀ against other welfare costs of pricing restrictions, in particular, the
potentially increased risk of price coordination. Such extensions are postponed
for future research.
Appendix A
By standard arguments (see, e.g., Tirole 1988), in optimum the high type is
exactly indiﬀerent between his own bundle and the low type’s, the high type
is served his first-best quantity, qH = vH , and the low type gets exactly zero
surplus. Setting (4) to equality gives
T ∗H =
1
2
(vH − qL)2 + T ∗L. (A1)
The low type’s participation constraint reads
vLqL −
q2L
2
− TL ≥ 0,
which gives that, in optimum,
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T ∗L = qL(vL −
1
2
qL). (A2)
Using (A1) and (A2), the firm’s unconstrained problem reads
Max
qL
µT ∗H + (1− µ)T ∗L.
=Max
qL
µ
µ
1
2
(vH − qL)2 + q
µ
vL −
1
2
qL
¶¶
+ (1− µ) qL
µ
vL −
1
2
qL
¶
,
which has the unique optimum
q∗L =
vL − µvH
1− µ . (A3)
Using (A3) gives the expression for T ∗L and T
∗
H in the text.
It is easily shown that the condition µ ≤ µ# also is necessary for the firm to
prefer serving both buyer types. Serving both types gives
µT ∗H + (1− µ)T ∗L =
1
2
µv2H − µvHq∗L + q∗LvL −
1
2
(1− µ)q∗2L , (A4)
whereas serving only the high type gives
µ
v2H
2
. (A5)
The diﬀerence (A4) - (A5) reads
1
2
q∗L (q
∗
L(µ− 1) + 2(vL − µvH)).
This is positive if and only if
2(vL − µvH)− q∗L(1− µ) ≥ 0.
Using (A3) this reduces to
µ ≤ vL
vH
= µ#.
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Appendix B
Setting vH = 1, F¯ = 1, and G(F ) = F gives
∆H (µ) =
1
32
¡
4µ2 − µ− v4L + µv4L
¢
.
Setting ∆H (µ) = 0 and solving for µ0 = {µ | ∆H (µ) = 0} gives the (relevant)
solution
µ0 =
1
8
q
16v4L + (v
4
L − 1)2 −
1
8
v4L +
1
8
.
Likewise,
∆LH (µ) =
3v4L + µ
3
¡
v4L − 1
¢
+ µ
¡
8v2L − 16v3L + 3v4L − 1
¢
+ µ2
¡
16v2L − 16vL − 3v4L + 6
¢
32 (1− µ)2
.
The correspondence µ00 = {µ | ∆LH (µ) = 0} can be solved for numerically
by inserting specific values for vL first, and then solve for the two (relevant)
roots of µ00(vL). The numerical results are displayed in the table below.
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v L v L / v H µ’ µ’’ 1 µ’’ 2
0 0 0,25 0 0,17157
0,02 0,02 0,25 0 0,18108
0,04 0,04 0,25 0 0,1902
0,06 0,06 0,25 0 0,19892
0,08 0,08 0,25003 0,0001285 0,20721
0,1 0,1 0,25007 0,0003211 0,21505
0,12 0,12 0,25016 0,0006845 0,2224
0,14 0,14 0,25029 0,0013087 0,22921
0,16 0,16 0,25049 0,0023134 0,23542
0,18 0,18 0,25078 0,0038549 0,24094
0,2 0,2 0,25119 0,0061369 0,24567
0,22 0,22 0,25174 0,009425 0,24945
0,24 0,24 0,25246 0,01407 0,25206
0,26 0,26 0,25337 0,020542 0,25325
0,28 0,28 0,2545 0,029496 0,25252
0,3 0,3 0,25589 0,04191 0,24917
0,32 0,32 0,25756 0,059427 0,24184
0,34 0,34 0,25953 0,085588 0,22729
0,36 0,36 0,26184 0,13715 0,18914
0,38 0,38 0,2645
0,4 0,4 0,26752
0,42 0,42 0,27093
0,44 0,44 0,27474
0,46 0,46 0,27894
0,48 0,48 0,28353
0,5 0,5 0,28853
0,52 0,52 0,29391
0,54 0,54 0,3
0,56 0,56 0,30581
0,58 0,58 0,3123
0,6 0,6 0,31913
Note: µ’’ 1  and µ’’ 2  meet approximately at v L  = 0,3625.
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